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ume honoring Pinhas Rosen (p. 52 onwards) – who offer the view that a section of the
Proclamation, from the words, "We […] hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish State
in Eretz-Yisrael" until the words "to be called 'Israel'," includes directives that are operative
and binding, and even though they are not defined as laws, they have the "value of law".
This view refers to the following three directives:
• The establishment of the state
• The naming of the state
• The setting down of the identity and composition of the central authorities of the state,
and establishment of the time when they become operative.
A ccording to Prof. Akzin, this in no way contradicts the ruling of the Supreme Court
concerning the nature and limited legal validity of the Scroll of Independence, since all
cases that had come to the court had turned on the declarative portion of the proclamation,
which made no pretense of setting down binding legal norms. Prof. Akzin's view should
not be rejected out of hand, and there is some support for it in the first ruling of the
Supreme Court in this regard. Although the court did not accept the argument that the
proclamation is included within the definition of "law", it did accept the counter-argument
that "the Proclamation comes only for the purposes of laying down the fact of the founding
of the state and its establishment for the purposes of its recognition by international law."
F urther on there appears the famous statement that the Scroll "expresses the nation's
vision and its manifesto, but it does not represent a constitutional law with a practical
ruling on the upholding of various orders and laws, or their nullification." It also states,
"The institution that has been authorized temporarily to legislate laws, is the Provisional
State Council, which was established with the declaration of the establishment of the
state." On this basis, I believe that Prof. Akzin was correct in his above-mentioned view,
to which Prof. Amnon Rubinstein also concurred in his book on Constitutional Law in
the State of Israel.
T herefore, although the Scroll of Independence in general is not defined as law, in
the usual sense of the word, and certainly not a Basic Law of the state to which regular
laws and administrative acts are subservient, certain of its directives, which set down the
founding of the state and its initial ruling institutions, have the "value of law" in terms of
their identity, composition and authority, and they possess binding validity.
Sekira Hodsheet (Monthly Review), Journal of I.D.F. Officers 4-5, May 1979
T he Declaration at a Distance 249
Proclamation, from the words, "We […] hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish State
in Eretz-Yisrael" until the words "to be called 'Israel'," includes directives that are operative
and binding, and even though they are not defined as laws, they have the "value of law".
This view refers to the following three directives:
• The establishment of the state
• The naming of the state
• The setting down of the identity and composition of the central authorities of the state,
and establishment of the time when they become operative.
A ccording to Prof. Akzin, this in no way contradicts the ruling of the Supreme Court
concerning the nature and limited legal validity of the Scroll of Independence, since all
cases that had come to the court had turned on the declarative portion of the proclamation,
which made no pretense of setting down binding legal norms. Prof. Akzin's view should
not be rejected out of hand, and there is some support for it in the first ruling of the
Supreme Court in this regard. Although the court did not accept the argument that the
proclamation is included within the definition of "law", it did accept the counter-argument
that "the Proclamation comes only for the purposes of laying down the fact of the founding
of the state and its establishment for the purposes of its recognition by international law."
F urther on there appears the famous statement that the Scroll "expresses the nation's
vision and its manifesto, but it does not represent a constitutional law with a practical
ruling on the upholding of various orders and laws, or their nullification." It also states,
"The institution that has been authorized temporarily to legislate laws, is the Provisional
State Council, which was established with the declaration of the establishment of the
state." On this basis, I believe that Prof. Akzin was correct in his above-mentioned view,
to which Prof. Amnon Rubinstein also concurred in his book on Constitutional Law in
the State of Israel.
T herefore, although the Scroll of Independence in general is not defined as law, in
the usual sense of the word, and certainly not a Basic Law of the state to which regular
laws and administrative acts are subservient, certain of its directives, which set down the
founding of the state and its initial ruling institutions, have the "value of law" in terms of
their identity, composition and authority, and they possess binding validity.
Sekira Hodsheet (Monthly Review), Journal of I.D.F. Officers 4-5, May 1979
T he Declaration at a Distance 249
