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Department of the Jewish Agency and the man who, two days later, would become Israel's
first Foreign Minister. Shertok was aligned with the camp that was hesitant to proclaim
the state, and he did not conceal this. On Saturday, May 8, he had met in Washington with
Foreign Secretary George Marshall, who had demanded that he proceed judiciously and
not rely too heavily on Hagana military successes, which could be short-lived. Marshall
had told him, with more than a hint of a threat: "When you go back and see your colleagues,
tell them about the situation here, and advise them as to what to do." In other words -
to accept the American proposal for a ceasefire and a postponement of the declaration.
Shertok arrived back in Tel Aviv on May 11. The Mapai Central Committee waited with
baited breath for its "number two" (after Ben-Gurion) in the Zionist and party leadership.
The hesitators had high hopes for him, wanting him to unify the camp that opposed what
it considered overly-hasty steps on Ben-Gurion's part. Of course, Ben-Gurion was well
aware of Shertok's hesitations, and he collared him before he appeared at the Central
Committee. Years later, Ben-Gurion told Michael Bar-Zohar that he had asked Shertok to
convey his impressions from his conversation with Marshall. Shertok proceeded to hold
forth, making no attempt to conceal his hesitations, finally concluding with the words, "I
think he's right." Ben-Gurion, according to his own account, went to the door, turned the
key in the lock, and said, "Moshe, in a short while you will be attending the meeting of the
party's Central Committee, where a decision is to be made about declaring the state. Give
them a full and precise account of the conversation with Marshall, but you're not leaving
here until you promise me one thing: that the last four words you said to me ("I think he's
right") – you won't say to the Central Committee." Shertok acquiesced to Ben-Gurion's
not-so-gentle pressure. At the meeting he explained the difficulties and concerns, thereby
heartening the objectors and those who were hesitant about the plan, but he concluded on
a supportive note (albeit with resignation): "It seems we have no choice; we have to move
forwards."
In light of these words, the hesitators and objectors understood that the matter was
closed. It was decided that there would be no vote amongst the Central Committee; the
body would vote unanimously in favor of declaring a state immediately, that same week.
The resolution read, "To propose to the People's Administration [which, from Friday, May
14, would be known as the 'Provisional Government'] to declare the establishment of the
Jewish state and its Provisional Government."
The depth of the concerns entertained by some of the Mapai leadership in view of this
fateful step is evidenced in the following rather obscure anecdote, which was published
for the first time more than 30 years after the events that it describes. Two of the "dovish"
leaders, Kaplan and Sprinzak, flew secretly to Paris, seemingly on May 9, to consult with
the most senior Jewish politician at the time - Léon Blum, former Prime Minister of France.
They presented him with the question: Isn't Ben-Gurion being too hasty? Perhaps "we
shouldn't rely on the view of the situation held by only one of our colleagues, no matter
how prominent and important he may be." Blum listened, pondered at length, and then
replied: "Ben-Gurion is right. This is a one-time opportunity that must not be missed. You
146 The Friday That Changed Destiny
first Foreign Minister. Shertok was aligned with the camp that was hesitant to proclaim
the state, and he did not conceal this. On Saturday, May 8, he had met in Washington with
Foreign Secretary George Marshall, who had demanded that he proceed judiciously and
not rely too heavily on Hagana military successes, which could be short-lived. Marshall
had told him, with more than a hint of a threat: "When you go back and see your colleagues,
tell them about the situation here, and advise them as to what to do." In other words -
to accept the American proposal for a ceasefire and a postponement of the declaration.
Shertok arrived back in Tel Aviv on May 11. The Mapai Central Committee waited with
baited breath for its "number two" (after Ben-Gurion) in the Zionist and party leadership.
The hesitators had high hopes for him, wanting him to unify the camp that opposed what
it considered overly-hasty steps on Ben-Gurion's part. Of course, Ben-Gurion was well
aware of Shertok's hesitations, and he collared him before he appeared at the Central
Committee. Years later, Ben-Gurion told Michael Bar-Zohar that he had asked Shertok to
convey his impressions from his conversation with Marshall. Shertok proceeded to hold
forth, making no attempt to conceal his hesitations, finally concluding with the words, "I
think he's right." Ben-Gurion, according to his own account, went to the door, turned the
key in the lock, and said, "Moshe, in a short while you will be attending the meeting of the
party's Central Committee, where a decision is to be made about declaring the state. Give
them a full and precise account of the conversation with Marshall, but you're not leaving
here until you promise me one thing: that the last four words you said to me ("I think he's
right") – you won't say to the Central Committee." Shertok acquiesced to Ben-Gurion's
not-so-gentle pressure. At the meeting he explained the difficulties and concerns, thereby
heartening the objectors and those who were hesitant about the plan, but he concluded on
a supportive note (albeit with resignation): "It seems we have no choice; we have to move
forwards."
In light of these words, the hesitators and objectors understood that the matter was
closed. It was decided that there would be no vote amongst the Central Committee; the
body would vote unanimously in favor of declaring a state immediately, that same week.
The resolution read, "To propose to the People's Administration [which, from Friday, May
14, would be known as the 'Provisional Government'] to declare the establishment of the
Jewish state and its Provisional Government."
The depth of the concerns entertained by some of the Mapai leadership in view of this
fateful step is evidenced in the following rather obscure anecdote, which was published
for the first time more than 30 years after the events that it describes. Two of the "dovish"
leaders, Kaplan and Sprinzak, flew secretly to Paris, seemingly on May 9, to consult with
the most senior Jewish politician at the time - Léon Blum, former Prime Minister of France.
They presented him with the question: Isn't Ben-Gurion being too hasty? Perhaps "we
shouldn't rely on the view of the situation held by only one of our colleagues, no matter
how prominent and important he may be." Blum listened, pondered at length, and then
replied: "Ben-Gurion is right. This is a one-time opportunity that must not be missed. You
146 The Friday That Changed Destiny
