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t declare the state – now or never!" (According to the testimony of journalist Michael
Asaf, who heard the story from Marc Jarblum, head of Mapai in France at the time, who
organized and attended the meeting of the two leaders with Blum.)
A ct Two – a majority of six vs. four
Or: Was there in fact a vote?
On that same day, May 12, another, even more dramatic discussion was held by the
People's Administration. This discussion lasted 13 straight hours, and here too the issue
on the agenda was the question of whether to declare independence or to accept the
American proposal. Ten members of the People's Administration were present: David
Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok, Eliezer Kaplan and David Remez from Mapai; Mordechai
Bentov and Aharon Zisling from Mapam; Pinhas Rosenblüth (Rosen) from the Aliya
Hadasha Party; Bekhor Sheetrit, representing the Sephardi community; Moshe Shapira of
the Po'el HaMizrahi; and Peretz Bernstein of the General Zionists. Three members of the
body were absent: Rabbi Y.L. Fishman (Maimon) of the Mizrahi and Yitzhak Gruenbaum
of the General Zionists, who could not be transported from the besieged Jerusalem to the
meeting; and Rabbi Y.M. Levin, of Agudat Yisrael, who was in New York.
Those present listened tensely to worrying reports: Golda Meyerson (Meir) reported
on her meeting with King Abdullah of Transjordan: he was now reneging on his previous
promise not to participate in the Arab assault on the Jewish state, claiming that when he
had made the commitment, in the autumn, "I thought that I controlled my own fate," but
now "I am one of five" (heads of Arab states that decided to invade upon expiration of the
Mandate). Moshe Shertok described his meeting with Foreign Secretary Marshall and his
warning that if the Jews went ahead anyway and declared their state, "Let them not ask
for American aid in the event of an invasion." He repeated several times the American
demand to postpone the declaration and to agree to a ceasefire. The top brass of the
Hagana – Yisrael Galili and Yigael Sukenik (Yadin), who had been invited to the meeting
by Ben-Gurion, displayed little optimism. Their reports suggested that, in the event of
an invasion, the Arab armies would have a clear advantage. Zeev Sharef, secretary of the
People's Administration, later described their pessimistic forecast: "Neither of them held
back from painting a very stark picture." Sukenik almost agreed to a ceasefire: "If it means
achieving that which we need, obtaining that which we lack, and doing that which we
need done, then it is desirable." (Sharef 's testimony)
The members of the People’s Administration were in a bind. Mordechai Bentov wrote
later in his memoirs that the decision to declare the state meant an assault by the Arab
armies: "Most of us weren't so certain that we would win, and had we lost – we, the
members of the government, would have been the first to be hanged by the Arabs in the
middle of Allenby Street."
Innumerable biographies, studies, and articles published since that time present the
Before the Declaration 147
Asaf, who heard the story from Marc Jarblum, head of Mapai in France at the time, who
organized and attended the meeting of the two leaders with Blum.)
A ct Two – a majority of six vs. four
Or: Was there in fact a vote?
On that same day, May 12, another, even more dramatic discussion was held by the
People's Administration. This discussion lasted 13 straight hours, and here too the issue
on the agenda was the question of whether to declare independence or to accept the
American proposal. Ten members of the People's Administration were present: David
Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok, Eliezer Kaplan and David Remez from Mapai; Mordechai
Bentov and Aharon Zisling from Mapam; Pinhas Rosenblüth (Rosen) from the Aliya
Hadasha Party; Bekhor Sheetrit, representing the Sephardi community; Moshe Shapira of
the Po'el HaMizrahi; and Peretz Bernstein of the General Zionists. Three members of the
body were absent: Rabbi Y.L. Fishman (Maimon) of the Mizrahi and Yitzhak Gruenbaum
of the General Zionists, who could not be transported from the besieged Jerusalem to the
meeting; and Rabbi Y.M. Levin, of Agudat Yisrael, who was in New York.
Those present listened tensely to worrying reports: Golda Meyerson (Meir) reported
on her meeting with King Abdullah of Transjordan: he was now reneging on his previous
promise not to participate in the Arab assault on the Jewish state, claiming that when he
had made the commitment, in the autumn, "I thought that I controlled my own fate," but
now "I am one of five" (heads of Arab states that decided to invade upon expiration of the
Mandate). Moshe Shertok described his meeting with Foreign Secretary Marshall and his
warning that if the Jews went ahead anyway and declared their state, "Let them not ask
for American aid in the event of an invasion." He repeated several times the American
demand to postpone the declaration and to agree to a ceasefire. The top brass of the
Hagana – Yisrael Galili and Yigael Sukenik (Yadin), who had been invited to the meeting
by Ben-Gurion, displayed little optimism. Their reports suggested that, in the event of
an invasion, the Arab armies would have a clear advantage. Zeev Sharef, secretary of the
People's Administration, later described their pessimistic forecast: "Neither of them held
back from painting a very stark picture." Sukenik almost agreed to a ceasefire: "If it means
achieving that which we need, obtaining that which we lack, and doing that which we
need done, then it is desirable." (Sharef 's testimony)
The members of the People’s Administration were in a bind. Mordechai Bentov wrote
later in his memoirs that the decision to declare the state meant an assault by the Arab
armies: "Most of us weren't so certain that we would win, and had we lost – we, the
members of the government, would have been the first to be hanged by the Arabs in the
middle of Allenby Street."
Innumerable biographies, studies, and articles published since that time present the
Before the Declaration 147
