Page 154 - big friday
P. 154
will certainly be many people who will be happy. If the group
does not achieve what it wants, there will be acclimatization to
the situation that will be created; there will be a reorganization
of the reality.
C learly, the question of what will happen in the event of
an invasion is a very serious one. There were friends in New
York who said, 'We won't touch this question. [Our] discretion
extends only so far. This is something that only the people in
Eretz Yisrael should deal with.' This wasn't a very comfortable
position for me, because I thought of myself as belonging to
Eretz Yisrael, even though I wasn't maintaining sufficient
contact – the distance was having its effect, and the irregularity
of communication also got in the way, for the good and the
bad. I wasn't in control of all the facts, to the extent that my desire and habit like to have
them at hand.
I must say that three elements coalesced in my considerations, causing me to arrive, over
the last few days at Lake Success [the UN headquarters] at my position that the risk of
postponing the proclamation of the Jewish state or the government – I'm not going to get
into the precise details of the wording right now – is greater than the risk of taking this
step.
The first [element], then, was my impression of the power of the blow delivered to the
Arab world. Admittedly, I have nothing new to add from the last few days concerning
the direct military facts that have arisen here, but the second wave of impressions comes
via Arab channels, and these convey a picture of turmoil, almost helplessness, of great
perplexity and of grave financial and technical difficulties arising from the mass Arab
flight and other related factors. In the same vein – perhaps this is something of an illusion,
but this was my impression there - the matter of the invasion is far more distant, in terms
of the possibility, in terms of the scope, and in terms of the danger, than we had previously
feared. That was my impression there. The impression here is quite different.
On the other hand, what became far more acute in my eyes, as the talks progressed, was the
direction that US policy is taking with regard to the essential point - the Jewish state, and
what the results would be if we were not to concede with regard to the date [of declaring
the state].
I wish to add here some explanation of the proposal of ten days [an American
suggestion to send a Jewish-Arab delegation to Palestine and to postpone the declaration
by ten days], which will certainly have received adequate coverage here. Well, I thought all
along that our strategy should be not to say 'no' to an American suggestion if this could be
avoided. If we have to say 'no', I thought, then better to say, 'Yes, we'll look into it' and then
afterwards to say, 'We looked into it, and it turns out that it's impossible,’ than to say 'no'.
And so, when I heard this suggestion of a ceasefire for the purposes of a ten-day truce, for
ten days of negotiations in Palestine to look into whether a Jewish-Arab agreement was
152 The Friday That Changed Destiny
does not achieve what it wants, there will be acclimatization to
the situation that will be created; there will be a reorganization
of the reality.
C learly, the question of what will happen in the event of
an invasion is a very serious one. There were friends in New
York who said, 'We won't touch this question. [Our] discretion
extends only so far. This is something that only the people in
Eretz Yisrael should deal with.' This wasn't a very comfortable
position for me, because I thought of myself as belonging to
Eretz Yisrael, even though I wasn't maintaining sufficient
contact – the distance was having its effect, and the irregularity
of communication also got in the way, for the good and the
bad. I wasn't in control of all the facts, to the extent that my desire and habit like to have
them at hand.
I must say that three elements coalesced in my considerations, causing me to arrive, over
the last few days at Lake Success [the UN headquarters] at my position that the risk of
postponing the proclamation of the Jewish state or the government – I'm not going to get
into the precise details of the wording right now – is greater than the risk of taking this
step.
The first [element], then, was my impression of the power of the blow delivered to the
Arab world. Admittedly, I have nothing new to add from the last few days concerning
the direct military facts that have arisen here, but the second wave of impressions comes
via Arab channels, and these convey a picture of turmoil, almost helplessness, of great
perplexity and of grave financial and technical difficulties arising from the mass Arab
flight and other related factors. In the same vein – perhaps this is something of an illusion,
but this was my impression there - the matter of the invasion is far more distant, in terms
of the possibility, in terms of the scope, and in terms of the danger, than we had previously
feared. That was my impression there. The impression here is quite different.
On the other hand, what became far more acute in my eyes, as the talks progressed, was the
direction that US policy is taking with regard to the essential point - the Jewish state, and
what the results would be if we were not to concede with regard to the date [of declaring
the state].
I wish to add here some explanation of the proposal of ten days [an American
suggestion to send a Jewish-Arab delegation to Palestine and to postpone the declaration
by ten days], which will certainly have received adequate coverage here. Well, I thought all
along that our strategy should be not to say 'no' to an American suggestion if this could be
avoided. If we have to say 'no', I thought, then better to say, 'Yes, we'll look into it' and then
afterwards to say, 'We looked into it, and it turns out that it's impossible,’ than to say 'no'.
And so, when I heard this suggestion of a ceasefire for the purposes of a ten-day truce, for
ten days of negotiations in Palestine to look into whether a Jewish-Arab agreement was
152 The Friday That Changed Destiny
