Page 171 - big friday
P. 171
A flyer in broken Hebrew dropped by Egyptian planes over Jewish settlements in
the Negev at the very start of the invasion
first moves before organizing Israel's army for battle.
During the wait, the company recalled the discussions amongst the General Staff over
the course of the previous two days. They knew quite well what the situation was on their
own side of the hill, but they had a somewhat exaggerated opinion of the enemy forces and
their weaponry. Yadin had reached the conclusion that Israel had little chance of victory
unless new supplies of ammunition and equipment came quickly. If indeed these arrived,
Israel would have a reasonable chance of holding out against an assault; both Ben-Gurion
and Yadin were convinced that the ships at sea and the Dakota supply planes that creaked
dangerously in the airports of Europe would pass and break through despite the closure
imposed by the Arab countries and the embargo imposed by the British and the UN. But
not a single Israeli leader in the Red House believed, that night, that Israel might win the
imminent war using the means it had available then.
According to Yadin, this uncertainty was almost entirely absent among the armed
After the Declaration 169
the Negev at the very start of the invasion
first moves before organizing Israel's army for battle.
During the wait, the company recalled the discussions amongst the General Staff over
the course of the previous two days. They knew quite well what the situation was on their
own side of the hill, but they had a somewhat exaggerated opinion of the enemy forces and
their weaponry. Yadin had reached the conclusion that Israel had little chance of victory
unless new supplies of ammunition and equipment came quickly. If indeed these arrived,
Israel would have a reasonable chance of holding out against an assault; both Ben-Gurion
and Yadin were convinced that the ships at sea and the Dakota supply planes that creaked
dangerously in the airports of Europe would pass and break through despite the closure
imposed by the Arab countries and the embargo imposed by the British and the UN. But
not a single Israeli leader in the Red House believed, that night, that Israel might win the
imminent war using the means it had available then.
According to Yadin, this uncertainty was almost entirely absent among the armed
After the Declaration 169
